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The Potential for Post-Discharge Lien
Survival:* Problems Surrounding
Sections 506(d) and 524(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978
Andrew J. Schmid**
Often with any new and expansive legislative achievement,
ambiguities which were unforeseen at the time of drafting emerge
later to undermine proposed goals. Such ambiguities and their predictably undermining effects are amply illustrated by sections
506(d) and 524(a) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and by the interrelationship of these sections.' Section 506(d) provides in pertinent part:
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is
not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void unless(1) a party in interest has not requested that the court determine and allow or disallow such claim under section 502
of this title ....
Some four years after the Code's enactment, debtors'8 rights
* Occasionally, reference will be made to a lien as inchoate. An inchoate lien
is defined as one which was neither challenged as invalid nor enforced at the time
of bankruptcy. As such, it passes through bankruptcy in a dormant state, but with
a potential for eventual attachment to property passing through bankruptcy
subject to the lien.
** B.G.S. University of Iowa, 1977; J.D. University of Nebraska, 1980; Member of the Nebraska Bar. The author is currently serving as law clerk for the
Honorable Richard N. DeGunther, Bankruptcy Judge for the Northern District of
Illinois, Western Division.
The author expresses his appreciation to Judge DeGunther, both for his
preparation of an earlier version of this article, and for his continued advice and
support.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(d), 524(a); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (principally codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501 with scattered
sections in 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter referred to as the Bankruptcy Code or simply,
the Code]. Discussion of § 524(a) and the interrelationship of the two sections is
largely reserved for later in this article. See infra notes 72-149 and accompanying
text.
2. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
3. The Code defines "debtor" as "(a) person or municipality concerning
which a case under this title has been commenced." Id. § 101(12). While § 506(d)
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under these sections remain unclear. Legislative history is sparse,"
and published cases are rare.' Yet it appears that section 506(d)
provides a significant codification, unavailable under the former
Bankruptcy Act,6 facilitating the fresh start philosophy traditionally inherent to American bankruptcy law.7 The section provides
is not exclusively a debtor's remedy, since it is available to any "party in interest," it is apparent that it is of principal benefit as a lien avoidance section to the
debtor. Yet § 506(d) is also of passive benefit to creditors as well, for it allows
liens to pass through the bankruptcy proceeding unaffected in the absence of adequate notice. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 506.07 (15th ed. 1979). A creditor
might also wish to actively invoke § 506(d) in the rare instance where he finds
himself oversecured. Particularly in a chapter 11 or 13 proceeding with depreciating security, an over-secured creditor might attempt through this section to assure full eventual satisfaction of his claim by incorporation of an equity cushion
in the § 506(d) order. This could also serve to underscore the interest bearing
aspect of the creditor's claim. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361(3), 506(b), 1129(b)(2),
1325(a)(5); see also 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 576 (2d ed. 1980). A creditor
might also simply wish to have the value of his security determined by the bankruptcy court. See infra note 21; see also infra note 59.
4. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1977) [hereinafter H. REP.];
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978) [hereinafter S. REP.].
5. For cases which discuss § 506(d) in some detail see In re Pitre, 11 Bankr.
777 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); In re Geiger, 12 Bankr. 410 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981);
In re Tanner, 14 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981). But see also In re Hotel
Assoc., Inc., 3 Bankr. 340 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); In re Harvey, 3 Bankr. 608
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980); In re Robertson, 4 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980); In
re Honaker, 4 Bankr. 415 (Bankr. E.D. Md. 1980); In re Williams, 7 Bankr. 234
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980); In re Sillani, 9 Bankr. 188 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re
Williams, 9 Bankr. 228 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); In re Walker, 11 Bankr. 43 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1981); In re Weathers, 5 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 935 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1981); In re LaRue, 13 Bankr. 846 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981). In the nearly two
and one-half years that the new Code has been in effect, no proceedings under §
506(d) have been filed in the Western Division of the Northern District of Illinois.
6. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-112 (1976) (repealed 1978) [hereinafter referred to as the Bankruptcy Act or simply, the Act].
7. From the first Bankruptcy Act of 1800 to the current Code, bankruptcy
law in the United States has undergone a gradual shift in policy. Initially confined
to involuntary proceedings brought against merchants, the emphasis was clearly
upon distribution of the bankrupt's assets among his creditors. Exemptions were
paltry, imprisonment was common and discharges were rare. Eventually, however,
the emphasis did shift with the development of the discharge. By 1934, the fresh
start policy had developed to the point where the Supreme Court described it as
follows:
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to
start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent
upon business misfortunes'.

. .

. This purpose of the act has been again
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that if the debtor requests the court to determine and allow or disallow a claim secured by a lien, the lien is void to the extent that
the claim is not allowed as a secured claim.
This article will illustrate and analyze the effect of lien avoidance under the Code,9 principally through the use of section
506(d).10 As a source for debtor relief, the lien avoiding function of
section 506(d) benefits the debtor in three ways. It can serve to
cure clouds on title to properties presently held, and similarly, aid
in post-bankruptcy property acquisitions. It can also serve as a
value-fixing remedy. Most importantly, though subject to some unand again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well as private
interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citation omitted). See also
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1917); Burlington v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459,
473 (1913); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902); Treer v.
Clews, 115 U.S. 528, 541 (1885); Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877).
Today, American bankruptcy law has as its two coelistent and often conflicting core policies the equal distribution of the debtor's non-exempt pre-bankruptcy assets to his creditors, and the promotion of a fresh start for the debtor
following bankruptcy. For an historical analysis of American bankruptcy law see
Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 CoM. L.J. 226 (1976).
8. See § 101(4) for definition of "claim"; § 101(28) broadly defines "lien" as a
"charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." Section 506(d) should be read in conjunction with § 506(a)
which provides in pertinent part:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which
the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the
value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property
...and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest. . . is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
As noted by one authority, "upon action by a party in interest, a predicate of
the voiding of the lien [under § 506(d)] is that the underlying claim has been
determined by the court not to be an allowed secured claim under § 506(a)." See

3

COLLIER,

supra note 3. See also infra note 21.

9. Occasionally, the term "avoidance" will be used in this article in reference
to § 506(d). It should be emphasized that the term "avoid" is susceptible to different meanings in different contexts, most notably where the debtor seeks to
avoid liens as exemption impairing under § 522(f). Where used in discussion of §
506(d), the term avoid means "void." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 124, 1411 (5th
ed. 1979). See also In re LaRue, 13 Bankr. 346 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981). See also
app. to this article.
10. On the constitutionality of § 506(d) lien avoidance, see In re Tanner, 14
Bankr. 933, 938-39 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981).
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certainty, section 506(d) may serve to void liens during the bankruptcy proceeding which might otherwise emerge later to attach to
debtor's property post-discharge, impairing the debtor's opportunity for a fresh start.
To emphasize what should be considered conscientious practice by debtor's counsel during the pendency of the bankruptcy
proceeding, ambiguities and post-discharge problems surrounding
section 506(d) and the interpretation of section 524(a) will also be
explored. Finally, judicial liens11 on real estate of chapter 7 consumer debtors 12 will be discussed for illustration, yet the principles
presented could apply to consensual liens,13 to personal property,"
11. Section 101(27) defines a "judicial lien" as "(a) lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding[.]" By
way of example, the following have been found to fall within this broad definition:
a lien created by filing a note containing a confession of judgment clause in accordance with judicial process (In re Natale, 5 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980)); a
writ of fieri facias and summons affectuating the writ in accordance with judicial
process (In re Baum, 15 Bankr. 538 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); and, more conventionally, a lien arising from state court attachment proceedings constitutes a "judicial lien" within the meaning of § 101(27) (In re Laird, 6 Bankr. 273 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1980)). [Hereinafter, the terms judicial lien and judgment lien will be
used interchangeably.]
To illustrate the operation of § 506(d), judicial liens serve as especially appropriate examples for several reasons. First of all, since consensual liens (e.g., mortgages) look to specific collateral (e.g., a specific parcel of real estate) for security,
they are less likely to be without supporting value. Judicial liens, on the other
hand, being involuntarily imposed, often lack value to support them and are
therefore more susceptible to being avoided, in whole or in part, for lack of security. Secondly, since it is quite common for realty held by a consumer debtor to
have prior encumbrances (e.g., mortgages), the usually subordinate status of a judicial lien renders it, again, more likely to be in a position without realty to attach. And while mortgages routinely include enforceable waiver of exemption
clauses, judicial liens do not enjoy such immunity. Consequently, subordinate to a
debtor's claim of homestead, judicial liens are again more likely to be without
value in realty to attach and hence, more likely to be voidable to some extent
under § 506(d). ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 52, §§ 1, 4 (1967 & West Supp. 1981-1982). See
infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66.
13. See In re Harvey, 3 Bankr. 608 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980) (security interest
in household goods); In re Robertson, 4 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (note
secured by deed of trust in real estate; In re Honaker, 4 Bankr. 415 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1980) (security interest in vehicles); In re Walker, 11 Bankr. 43 (Bankr.
N.D. IlI. 1981) (second mortgage on real estate); see also In re Tanner, 14 Bankr.
933 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981) (especially noteworthy because of the third mortgage
on real estate); In re Weathers, 5 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 935 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1981) (mortgage on real estate).
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and to chapter 11 or 13 proceedings. 1'
SECTION 506(d) MECHANICS

To illustrate the application of section 506(d), consider the
following: At the time the debtor files his petition in bankruptcy
he owns no real estate, 16 but there is a memorandum of judgment
recorded against him 17 in the county recorder's office. Under Illinois law the judgment creditor would have a lien against real estate owned or acquired by the debtor in the county where the
memorandum of judgment is recorded. 1 ' Because the debtor owns
no real estate, the judicial lien is unsupported by any value in
property. It cannot, therefore, secure the judgment creditor's claim
in bankruptcy.19 Simply stated, a lien represents an allowed secured claim only to the extent of the value of property which the
creditor may reach to satisfy his claim," ° measured at the time of
filing.' Under these circumstances, the debtor may invoke the
14. See In re Harvey, 3 Bankr. 608 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980); In re Honaker, 4
Bankr. 415 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980).
15. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174; Id. §§ 1301-1330. See also § 103(b) which provides that "[clhapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case under chapter 7, 11,
or 13 of this title."
Section 506 might also apply to situations where a lien cannot secure a claim
for reasons other than absence of supporting value, e.g., with the presence of a
lien purporting to support an allowed secured claim under § 506(a) in an amount
greater than that permitted by computations present under §§ 502(b)(7),
502(b)(8). However, this article remains principally concerned with § 506(d) lien
avoidance because of absence of supporting value in security rather than other
reasons under the substantive provisions of § 502(b).
16. Id. § 301.
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 1 (1966 & West Supp. 1981-1982).
18. Id. The section reads in pertinent part:
(A] judgment shall be a lien on the real estate of the person against
whom it is rendered or made in any county in this state, including the
county in which it is rendered or made, only from the time a transcript,
certified copy or memorandum of the judgment is filed in the office of the
recorder of deeds in the county in which the real estate is located.
Id. 5. See Wales v. Bogue, 31 Ill. 464 (1863), and cases cited infra at note 74.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). See supra note 8 for quote of relevant material.
20. Id.
21. The assertion that values are fixed at the time of filing is a tentative one
based on the assumption, hardly unassailable, that the debtor's schedules will reflect property values accurately. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(1); BANKR. R. 302, 302.
Where a creditor chooses not to contest his treatment as unsecured by the avoidance of his lien, values will remain in all likelihood as represented in debtor's
schedules. However, post-filing valuation questions may arise because of apprecia-
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remedy provided by section 506(d) by requesting the bankruptcy
court,2 through an adversary proceeding,28 to disallow the claim as
secured and to declare the judicial lien void in its entirety.2 ' An
tion, depreciation or simply honest dispute and these may be resolved as incident
to the § 506(d) determination. Section 506(a) and the accompanying legislative
history clearly indicate that a flexible approach is to be taken to questions of
valuation. See H. REP., supra note 4, at 356. For a further discussion see
Hagedorn, The Survival and Enforcement of the Secured Claim Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54 Am. BANKR. L.J. 1, 4 (1980); see also infra
note 59.
22. The assertion that values are fixed at the time of filing is a tentative one
based on the assumption, hardly unassailable, that the debtor's schedules will reflect property values accurately. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(1); Despite research covering
several bankruptcy form manuals, the author has been unable to discover suggested forms for either the § 506(d) complaint or order. But see 6 COLLIER, supra
note 3, Form 5-136.
23. See BANKA. R. 701. See also Proposed Fed. Bankr. R. 3012 (Preliminary
Draft of Proposed New Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms. Law. Co-op).
24. Because the language of § 506(d) stresses the allowance or disallowance of
a claim under § 502, there is some authority for the proposition that in the absence of a properly filed proof of claim, the bankruptcy court is constrained from
proceeding under § 506(d). 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-502. In In re Hotel Assoc. the court
reached the following conclusion:
The Code provides in § 502 that a claim or interest is deemed "allowed"
only when a proofof claim is filed, and no objection is made. Because the
claims have not been properly placed before the court, [i.e., by a filed
proof of claim] we are forced to conclude that, at present, Plaintiff cannot proceed under § 506.
In re Hotel Assoc., Inc., 3 Bankr. 340, 342 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980). See also 9 AM.
Jtm. 2D, supra note 3, at § 576; see also id. at n.85.
See 3 COLLIER, supra note 3:
Where a party in interest has not requested that the court make the determination concerning the allowability of the claim pursuant to the allowability provisions of section 502, the lien is not void notwithstanding
that it secures a claim against the debtor that would not be an allowed
secured claim under section 506(a). This remains true even though no
proof of claim has been filed by the holder of the claim or by any other
entity entitled under section 501(b) or (c) to file a proof of the claim.
Clearly, a claim, proof of which has not been filed, cannot be allowed
under the terms of section 502. But the absence of a proof (which is a
request for allowance of the claim) and of any complaint to determine
the extent or validity of the claim or the lien securing it (which is a form
of request for disallowance of the claim) brings paragraph (1) of section
506(d) into play, thereby relieving the lien from the voiding effect of the
lead-in clause of section 506(d).
See also In re Robertson, 4 Bankr. 213, 216 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980); 1 NORTON
BANKE. LAW AND PRAC. § 28.27 (1981). If the narrow approach adopted by the
Court in Hotel Assoc. is the correct view, the problem may be obviated by filing a
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order of the bankruptcy court should then be entered reflecting
this result.2 5 The debtor should then have the order recorded in

the office of the county recorder.1
If respected as it should be in a subsequent title search,27 the
recorded order will supercede the memorandum of judgment to
prevent the judicial lien from impairing the debtor's fresh start,
notably in future loan negotiations involving real estate.2 8 The recorded order would further serve to minimize the possibility of
subsequent state court proceedings by the judgment creditor reluctant to surrender his claim notwithstanding the debtor's discharge
in bankruptcy. 9 In this instance, if the debtor obtains his discharge and the judgment creditor's claim is discharged, 80 there can
be no enforcement of judgment or judgment lien regardless of
whether or not the debtor chooses to void the lien by operation of
section 506(d). As a result of the, discharge in bankruptcy, the judicial lien is actually less than inchoate, it is unenforceable. This is
proof of the creditor's claim either prior to or concurrent with the filing of the
complaint seeking a § 506(d) determination. See 11 U.S.C. § 501(c). Though possibly redundant, where the record reveals no proof filed, this may be considered
recommended procedure for a debtor proceeding under § 506(d).
25. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 77, § 69 (1966 & West Supp. 1981-1982).
26. Id. Where a memorandum of judgment is recorded as provided by state
law as a lien against the real property of a debtor then owned or later acquired,
and an order issued by the bankruptcy court is later recorded which declares the
lien to some extent void in accordance with federal law, the lien is void and of no
effect to the extent federal law so provides. The above section of Illinois law
seems to reflect this, for to construe the state law otherwise would conflict with
this constitutionally mandated principle. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
As stated in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971), "any state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by
the Supremacy Clause." For an extensive discussion of potential state law conflict
with federal bankruptcy law see Lake, Conflict: The Bankruptcy Act v. State
Statutes, 83 CoM. L.J. 223 (1978).
27. Lake, supra note 26.
28. The curative effect of the § 506(d) order applies in any situation to clear
title to the extent the lien is without value to support it, e.g., in any of the situations presented in this section of the article.
29. The order may serve as the basis for pleading the nonenforceability of the
lien in subsequent state court proceedings. Note that without the § 506(d) order,
the discharge order will not serve as the basis for such pleading even where, under
the narrow approach to the discharge injunction discussed infra, attachable value
in property subject to the lien was not available at the time'of bankruptcy. See
infra notes 108-17, 126-35 and accompanying text. See also ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch.
110, § 48(1)f (West Supp. 1981).
30. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727.
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true whenever there is no property in the bankruptcy estate to
which a lien can attach.' 1 Section 524(a) bars post-bankruptcy enforcement not only of the underlying judgment,8 ' but of the judgment lien as well."8 Therefore, the debtor's purpose in seeking a
section 506(d) order under these circumstances is to have erased
what would later be a cloud, albeit clearable, on title to realty he
acquires in the future."
Where the debtor owns real estate at the time of filing in
which there is no equity available for exemption," s the mechanics
of section 506(d) lien avoidance are basically the same as where
there is no real estate at all. It is assumed that with the consent of
the mortgagees, the debtor has managed to retain possession of the
realty."6 Consider the following:' 7
$ 40,000 Value of Real Estate
30,000 First Mortgage
10,000 Second Mortgage
100,000 Recorded Judgment Lien
Assuming the mortgages are valid and enforceable,"8 and that
31. The filing of a petition in bankruptcy creates an estate. See id. § 541(a); 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 541.01 (15th ed. 1979). See also infra note 34.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)1. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)2. See infra notes 97-102, 111-112 and accompanying
text.
34. While a § 506(d) order is decidedly preferable, since it expressly voids the
lien, under these limited circumstances the discharge order at least impliedly has
the same effect. See supra note 33. See also infra note 112; A. COHEN, BANKRUPTCY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS

AND OTHER DEBTOR-CREDITOR

MArERS

13-

311.41 (1st ed. 1981).
35. The Illinois homestead exemption statute is codified in ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 52 §§ 1-12 (1967 & West Supp. 1981-1982).
36. Continued possession is accomplished by informal negotiation, possibly
involving reaffirmation of the mortgagee's claims. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c), 524(d)
and infra note 36. With foreclosure at best a troublesome and time consuming
alternative, creditors secured by realty may consider a discharged debtor (barred
for six years from again filing bankruptcy) to be on balance, a good credit risk.
See generally ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 18(e) (1966 & West Supp. 1981-1982); 11
U.S.C. §§ 727(a)8. By inadvertence or through recognition of the principles discussed in this section, the judgment creditor has not asserted his claim as secured
in any amount and is being treated as unsecured. See Rendleman, Liquidation
Bankruptcy Under the '78 Code, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 575, 657 (1981).
37. Except where otherwise indicated, the basic fact pattern used to illustrate
the operation of § 506(d) focuses on the typical consumer debtor whose only real
property is his residence.
38. Except where otherwise indicated, any mortgage included in the basic
fact pattern contains a valid waiver of exemption clause. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
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both enjoy a priority over the judicial lien,8 their satisfaction
would consume the value of the realty. Further assuming that the

judgment creditor did not acquire his lien within a pre-filing preference period, 40 and the lien is not otherwise avoidable 41 nor
avoided by the trustee,42 the debtor may have the judicial lien declared void in its entirety under section 506(d). As where the
debtor has no real property during the pendency of the bankruptcy
proceeding, this would serve to clear away the judicial lien as a
potential cloud on title to his real estate, but would it serve any
other purpose? Is there any cause for debtor concern, where all the

value of the real estate is encumbered by priority liens, that the

judgment lienholder might later find some property to attach if his
48
lien is not avoided?
Changing the facts slightly, assume that there is no second
mortgage. The applicable figures at the time of filing are:
$ 40,000 Value of Real Estate
52, § 4 (1966 & West Supp. 1981-1982) for recognition of the validity of such
clauses. See infra note 50 for the text of this section.
39. Except where otherwise indicated, mortgage priority over judgment liens
in the basic fact pattern will be assumed. See supra note 11.

40. 11 U.S.C. 8 547(b)4.

41. 11 U.S.C. §8 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 724(a). In the absence of any action
by the trustee, the debtor may invoke these powers of avoidance to realize an
exemption if the transfer involved was not concealed by the debtor, and was involuntarily made or involved a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in household goods. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(g), 522(h), 101(40); In re Stratton, 8
Bankr. 674 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981). See also In re Pierce, 6 Bankr. 18 (Bankr. N.D.
IlM. 1980); In re Jordan, 5 Bankr. 59 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
42. Although possible, since there is nothing available for distribution to unsecured creditors, it is not anticipated that the trustee would act under these circumstances. The judicial lien, however avoided, is simply without supporting
value. Note, however, that an avoided lien, even per § 506(d), is preserved for the
benefit of the estate by § 551. While there is no apparent value to the estate of a
lien voided for lack of value, there are reasons other than absence of supporting
value which would warrant § 506(d) lien avoidance and its corresponding preservation under § 551. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) and supra note 15. Preservation also
anticipates (perhaps coincidentally) a possible dismissal, in which case the lien
may be reinstated by operation of § 349(b)(1)(C).
43. See infra notes 103-157 and accompanying text.
44. Here and throughout the discussion following, the debtor is attempting to
retain possession of the realty. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. With
respect to the judgment creditor, in this instance the outcome discussed prevails
regardless of whether or not he attempts to assert his claim as secured in any
amount, i.e., the judgment creditor is wholly unsecured. See infra note 52 and
accompanying text. See also infra note 86.
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30,000 Mortgage
10,000 Equity
100,000 Recorded Judgment Lien

Pursuant to Code section 522(b)1,11 Illinois has elected to bar

the debtor's choice of the federal exemption scheme. 46 Therefore,

45. Section 522(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may
exempt from property of the estate...
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section,
unless the state law that is applicable to the debtor ... specifically
does not so authorize....
46. Id. When a state chooses to "opt out" under § 522(b), the exemption
provisions provided by § 522(d) are no longer available to debtors filing bankruptcy in that state. An Illinois debtor in bankruptcy will now look to chapter 52
to determine his available exemptions. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, § 101 (West
Supp. 1981-1982).
A recent bankruptcy court decision, after thoughtful analysis, reached the
following conclusion regarding the constitutional sufficiency of the Illinois exemption scheme:
[S]tates which wish to elect to opt out of the federal exemptions must
still provide debtors adequate property for them to begin fresh starts.
Congress has treated the subject matter of exemptions in a detailed and
comprehensive manner in § 522 of the Code. The framework and principles of that section are those Congress intended that the States use when
acting under the authority delegated to them. In re Rhodes, 14 B.R. 629
(Bankruptcy Court M.D. Tenn. 1981). The Illinois exemptions allow a
debtor who qualifies as a householder to take a $10,000.00 homestead
exemption, necessary wearing apparel, Bible, school books, family pictures, $300.00 worth of additional property can be exempted [sic]. Debtors who are head of family are allowed to exempt an additional $700.00
worth of property, pensions, compensation bonuses received from the
United States or from the State of Illinois can also be exempted [sic].
Notably, these exemptions discriminate against renters and fail to protect a debtor's household goods. Congress made a general exemption in §
522(d)(1) and (d)(5) to insure that homeowners and non-homeowners
would have equal fresh starts. Matter of Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 891 (7th
Cir. 1981). This is particularly important in an urban setting where most
of the population live in rented apartments. ...
The Illinois exemptions provide nothing comparable to § 522(d)(5)
and § 522(d)(3) and therefore fail to provide debtors with property Congress found necessary for them to have fresh starts. The exercise by Illinois of the opt out provision in § 522(b)(1) goes beyond the authority
Congress delegated to Illinois when Congress enacted that section. Public
Act 81-1505 directly conflicts with the policies of Congress found in §
522(d). Public Act 81-1505 is invalid under the supremacy clause of the
Constitution.
In re Balgemann, 16 Bankr. 780, 782-83 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982).
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Illinois law must be consulted in order to determine the exemptions available.47 If the debtor had a family and filed for bankruptcy in 1981," he would be entitled to a $10,000 exemption for
homestead.4 9 This would consume the equity remaining beyond
that value reachable for satisfaction of mortgage. As an exemption
for homestead in Illinois in effect subordinates an interest attachable to real estate, absent a valid waiver,5° the judicial lien in this
For a discussion of some of the problems surrounding a state's election to
foreclose a debtor's choice of the federal exemption scheme by opting out under §
522(b), see Duncan, Through the Trap Door Darkly: Nebraska Exemption Policy
and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 60 NzB. L. REv. 219, 219-32 (1981).
47. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 52, § 101 (West Supp. 1981-1982) which states
that "[i]n accordance with the provision of Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code of 1978 ... residents of this State shall be prohibited from using the federal exemptions provided in Section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978...
except as may otherwise be permitted under the laws of Illinois."
48. Section 1 of the Homestead Act, prior to amendment effective January 1,
1982, provided:
Every householder having a family shall be entitled to an estate of homestead to the extent in value of $10,000.00, in the farm or lot of land and
buildings thereon, owned or rightly possessed by lease or otherwise and
occupied by him or her as a residence and such homestead, and all right
and title therein, shall be exempt from attachment, judgment, levy or
judgment sale for the payment of his or her debts or other purposes and
from the laws of conveyance, descent and devise, except as hereinafter
provided or as provided in Section 20-6 of the Probate Act of 1975 as
heretofore or hereafter amended. This Section is not applicable as between joint tenants or tenants in common but it is applicable as to any
creditors of such persons.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, § 1 (1967 & West Supp. 1981-1982) (amended by P.A. 82685 (1982)).
The basic qualifications for homestead under chapter 52 were described as
follows:
The homestead exemption provided by Section 1 of the Homestead Act
may be claimed when three criteria have been satisfied. A person must
be (1) a householder, (2) with a family, and (3) occupying the land as a
residence. A householder is one who owns a dwelling house capable of
being occupied as a dwelling. A family is a person or persons dependent
upon the householder for support. The land must be occupied as a dwelling. Once these qualifications have been satisfied the homestead is exempt from third-party claims by attachment or execution .... (citations
omitted).
Chapman v. Rickey, 63 Ill. App. 3d 650, 379 N.E.2d 1334 (5th Dist. 1978). See
also 3 COLLIER, supra note 3, at 11 522.05[4], 522.23.'
49. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 52, § 10. See also 11 U.S.C. § 522(1).
50. Section 4 of the Homestead Act provides in pertinent part:
No release, waiver or conveyance of the estate so exempted, shall be
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example is without value to support it." Therefore, the judicial
lien may be avoided in its entirety under section 506(d).
If the debtor did not qualify for homestead,58 the $10,000 equity is non-exempt and remains attachable by the judgment creditor. In this event the $100,000 judicial lien is undersecured in the
amount of $90,000, and may be avoided in a section 506(d) proceeding only to this extent, leaving an unavoided judicial lien rep5
resenting an allowed secured claim in the amount of $10,000. 4
valid, unless the same is in writing, subscribed by the householder and
his or her wife or husband, if he or she have one, and acknowledged in
the same manner as conveyances of real estate are required to be
acknowledged ...
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, § 4 (1967 & West Supp. 1981-1982). See also app. to this
article.
51. See app. to this article.
52. Computed as follows:
Value of real estate
$40,000
Less amount due mortgage
30,000
Equity remaining after satisfaction of mortgage
10,000
Less debtor's claim of homestead
10,000
Equity remaining after satisfaction of mortgage and homestead
0
Judgment lien
100,000
May attach to 0 as secured claim (i.e., remaining equity)
Leaving
$100,000 as unsecured claim
per § 506(a), so the lien is
avoidable in this amount per
§ 506(d).
Note that the debtor did not pursue his remedy under § 522(f)1 which provides:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the
fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that
such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been
entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is(1) a judicial lien . . .
The debtor chose not to proceed under § 522(f)(1) because absent a signed and
written waiver of exemption, an unlikely factor to consider where a judgment lien
is involved (caveat: cognovit judgments), a lien of any kind in Illinois is
subordinate to a debtor's exemption of homestead by operation of state law. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, §§ 1, 4 (1967 & West Supp. 1981-1982); see also Chapman
v. Rickey, 63 Ill. App. 3d 650, 379 N.E.2d 1334 (5th Dist. 1978). If the judgment
lien is subordinate to the homestead, there is no impairment of the exemption
and consequently, no authority for or need to proceed under § 522(f)(1). For further discussion, see app. to this article.
53. See supra note 48.
54. Computed as follows:
Value of real estate
$40,000
Less amount due mortgage
30,000
Equity remaining
10,000
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The order of court also will serve to benefit the debtor in future attempts to acquire additional real estate55 and, assuming the
debtor manages to retain possession of this realty," where he later
attempts to sell.57 The order also benefits the debtor by fixing the
value of the judgment creditor's lien, for after the order is entered,58 the lien cannot be enforced in an amount in excess of
$10,000.59

100,000
$10,000 as secured claim
(i.e. remaining equity)
Leaving $90,000 as unsecured claim per § 506(a) and voidable in this
amount per § 560(d).
55. A recorded judgment lien remains as a cloud on title to real estate which
the debtor acquires in the future. If not expunged (or at least reduced) by recording the order of court, lending institutions might understandably be reluctant to
extend credit to the debtor as it would appear that they would be assuming a
secured position in the realty inferior to the judgment lien recorded earlier. This
would at least involve the debtor in negotiation with the judgment creditor to
obtain a release of judgment and waiver of lien and possibly involve proceedings
to clear the record, all of which could have been obviated (at least partially) by
pursuing the remedy available under § 506(d) in the prior bankruptcy proceeding.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 69 (1966 & West Supp. 1981-1982). See also supra
notes 26-29. At worst, the memorandum of judgment could cost the debtor credit
which might otherwise have been available and remain as a potentially attachable
lien against real estate of the debtor which passed through bankruptcy. See infra
notes 56-57. Current bankruptcy law, even under the broad view of the discharge
injunction discussed infra, does not fully distinguish results such as that obtained
in Rochelle State Bank v. Gavic, 70 Ill. App. 3d 42, 388 N.E.2d 436 (2d Dist. 1979)
(discharge did not have effect of releasing lien of judgment on debtor's residence).
See infra notes 70-156 and accompanying text.
56. The judgment creditor is now in a position during the case to frustrate
the debtor's attempt to retain possession of the realty. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
Along with the mortgagee, the debtor now has to negotiate forebearance of the
judgment creditor as well, again possibly by reaffirmation of the claim partially
secured by judgment. See id. at § 524(c) and infra note 87. In the alternative, the
debtor may be able to liquidate the judgment creditor's secured claim, possibly by
obtaining a second mortgage. To avoid potential problems post-discharge, the
debtor would need to obtain a release of judgment. See, e.g., infra notes 130-31
and accompanying text.
57. To the extent the amount of an outstanding encumbrance can be reduced, it would seem to facilitate the eventual transfer of the encumbred res, e.g.,
by enhancing the possibility of consensual sale. In addition, reducing the outstanding amount of the judgment lien from $100,000 to $10,000 obviously increases the possibility of immediate or eventual satisfaction. See ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 77, § 68(a) (1966 & West Supp. 1981-1982).
58. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
59. In In re Tanner, 14 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981), the court deJudgment lien
May attach to
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As the result of further amendment of Illinois' exemption
law," a debtor may find his potential exemption for homestead
substantially changed in 1982. For example, if an individual without dependents, the debtor may elect to exempt $7500, previously
unavailable, for homestead. 1 He may then void the $100,000 judicial lien in the circumstances above in the amount of $97,500, leaving an unavoidable lien securing claim in the amount of $2500."
scribed the operation of § 506(d) as follows:
The Code scheme of Section 506 is that creditors receive through the
valuation procedure of the Bankruptcy Court the same property value
that they would receive through a non-bankruptcy forced sale of the
Debtor's non-exempt assets as of the petition date ....
The operation of
Section 506(d) merely effectuates the marketplace.
The operation of subsection (d) to avoid undersecured real property
mortgages is consistent with the Code's policy of providing the Debtor a
fresh start.
Id. at 936-37.
See also In re Pitre, 11 Bankr. 777, 781 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981) where the
court concluded that "section 506 looks to the value of the property at the time of
bankruptcy and sets the creditor's secured claim and thereby the amount of its
lien for all time."
In a § 506 hearing the court attempts to arrive at a fair valuation of the
property involved and interests in it, and, when requested under subsection (d),
to mirror these values in its order. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
See also supra note 54.
60. ILL. Rsv. STAT. ch. 52.
61. Id. Section 1 of the Illinois exemption statute now provides, in pertinent
part:
Every individual shall be entitled to an estate of homestead to the extent
in value of $7500 in the farm or lot of land and building thereon, a condominium or in personal property, owned or rightly possessed by lease
or otherwise and occupied by him or her as a residence, or in a cooperative that owns property that the individual uses as a residence ....
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 52, § 1 (amended by P.A. 82-685 (1982)) (emphasis added).
Replacement of the "householder having a family" requirement for allowance
of homestead with the broader classification of "individual," along with the other
changes italicized above, may cure the constitutional deficiencies in the Illinois
exemption scheme as perceived by the Bankruptcy Court in In re Balgemann, 16
Bankr. 780 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982).
Liberalization of the personal property exemptions, more in keeping with the
federal scheme found in § 522(c) of the Code, should also serve to reduce the risk
of constitutional attack on Balgemann grounds. See ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 52, § 13
(1967 & West Supp. 1981-1982) (amended by P.A. 82-685 (1982)); 11 U.S.C. §
522(d). See also Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Whether Illinois's Use of
the Federal "Opt Out" Provision is Constitutional,1 S. ILL. U.L.J. 65 (1981).
62. Based on the fact pattern presented supra at note 52, this is computed as
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Where the debtor files jointly with spouse," the couple's maximum allowable homestead would be $15,000." Under the facts
above, 5 subtraction of the mortgagee's right to first satisfaction
consumes $30,000 of the value of the property. As debtor's homestead is limited to the equity available when less than the maximum allowable, they may claim $10,000 as exempt. After subtraction for satisfaction of mortgage and homestead, the value of the
residence is exhausted. At this figurative point," since nothing remains to which the judicial lien can attach, the joint debtors may
look to their remedy under section 506(d) to have the judicial lien
declared void as it does not secure a claim against the debtors
which can be allowed as secured. 7
follows:
$40,000
Value of real estate
30,000
Less amount due on mortgage
$10,000
Equity remaining after satisfaction of mortgage
7,500
Less debtor's claim of homestead
Equity remaining after satisfaction of mortgage and homestead $2,500
100,000
Judgment Lien
$2,500 as secured claim
May attach to
(i.e., remaining equity)
$97,500 as unsecured claim per
Leaving
§ 506(a), so the lien
is avoidable in this
amount per § 506(d).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 302.
64. Section 522(m) provides that "this section [§ 522] shall apply separately,
with respect to each debtor on a joint case." Replacement of the "householder
having a family" requirement for allowance of homestead with the broader classification of "individual" has the effect of bringing the Illinois exemption law in
closer alignment with the federal alternative under § 522(d) by allowing "individual" joint petitioners a double homestead allowance, previously unavailable, similar to that provided by § 522(d)(1). This also serves to further reduce the risk of
constitutional challenge on Balgemann grounds. See supra notes 46 & 61.
65. See supra text at note 44.
66. Recalling the debtor's intent to retain possession, the figures discussed
may be viewed as assignments of value rather than monies realized from immediate liquidation. In this way, a proceeding brought under § 506(d) fixes values of
secured claims, voiding, at least in part, those liens to which there is no value to
attach at the time of bankruptcy. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. See
also supra notes 44 & 59.
67. Computed as follows:
$40,000
Value of real estate
30,000
Less amount due mortgage
$10,000
Equity remaining after satisfaction of mortgage
15,000
Less debtor's claim of homestead
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The situations illustrated in this section were not presented as
an exhaustive list of possibilities which debtor's counsel may confront in the chapter 7 consumer context and remedy with the use
of section 506(d). They were principally presented to show how the
section may be applied to void unsecured liens. Priorities among
lien claimants, values and exemption possibilities may shift. In the
final analysis, however, section 506(d) serves as an available remedy to void liens remaining-whatever their nature or origin-once
the value of attachable property is exhausted by senior secured
claims and exemptions.
Having addressed the question of how to avoid unsecured
liens, it is now appropriate to consider why. Specifically, since section 506(d) can only be used to void a lien to the extent it is unsecured at the time of bankruptcy, to what can an unsecured lien
attach post-bankruptcy if it is not avoided? The limited benefit of
section 506(d) as a curative and value-fixing device has been discussed."8 However, if these are the only functions which section
506(d) can serve, is the section merely a remedy without substance,
little more than a "paper tiger"?s9 To answer these questions, the
Equity remaining after satisfaction of mortgage
and homestead
0
Judgment lien
100,000
May attach to
0 as secured claim
(i.e., no remaining equity)
Leaving
$100,000 as unsecured claim per §
506(a), so the lien is
voidable in this amount per §
506(d).
See supra note 52. See also app. to this article.
68. See supra notes 28-34, 55-59 & 64 and accompanying text. But see also
infra note 125.
69. Depending upon the extent of protection accorded debtor's property
post-discharge by the discharge provisions of the Code, assigning values and determining the extent of lien avoidability in a § 506(d) hearing may only resolve
problems of value and title which can be cured later. If the discharge sections of
the Code serve as a total bar to attachment of any property or values by pre-filing
liens excepting only that which was attachable at the time of bankruptcy, then §
506(d) only serves to resolve problems during the bankruptcy proceeding which
may be resolved later as well, albeit with greater difficulty and at greater expense.
See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text. While during the pending bankruptcy proceeding § 506(d) would still be preferable for resolving such problems
since it is available when the determining values are the current ones, the case
may be reopened at a later date to determine the attachability and values which
were relevant at the time of the original proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 350(b). State
court proceedings may provide the same result. But see supra note 125 and ac-
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THE EFFECT OF DISCHARGE: A BRIEF REVIEW OF ITS DEVELOPMENT
AND CURRENT SCOPE

Historically, the law of bankruptcy has not served the bankrupt 71 as an automatic and complete bar against the survival and
enforcement of liens post-discharge.7 On the contrary, if not invalidated during the bankruptcy proceeding 7 ' and if permitted by
state law,7 ' continued enforceability of liens as encumbrances
against property of the bankrupt, even as against property clearly
acquired after discharge, traditionally has been the rule.7 ' Not until amendment of the Bankruptcy Act in 1970 did the scope of the
discharge undergo extensive reform.7 Formerly, the bankruptcy
companying text.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a).
71. A debtor in bankruptcy was referred to as a "bankrupt" under the Act.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1(4) (repealed 1978). The change in terminology largely reflects an
effort to move away from the negative connotation associatied with the term
"bankrupt." See 11 U.S.C. 101(12); see also H. REP., supra note 4, at 310.
72. Prior to enactment of the Code, even under the most recent revision of
the Bankruptcy Act's discharge provisions, no statutory language prevented the
continued enforcement after discharge of valid prefiling liens. See 11 U.S.C. § 14
(revised 1976) (repealed 1978), and infra note 79; ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 77, § 1. See
also Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886); Ostrow, The ChangingNature of the
Dischargein Bankruptcy, ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 403, 404-07 (1979); 9A AM. JuR.
2D, supra note 3, at § 779; Shanor, A New Deal for Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 28 EMoRY L.J. 587, 643 (1979); 1 COLLIER ON BANKurrcy 17.29 (1978).
73. E.g., by the trustee pursuant to his powers of avoidance, by the debtor
pursuant to these powers, or by operation of § 506(d). See supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
74. See Ostrow, supra note 72, at 405. See also COLLIER, supra note 72, at
17.30.
75. For Illinois cases allowing post-discharge attachment of a prefiling lien to
property passing through bankruptcy (under pre-Code law) see Rochelle State
Bank v. Gavic, 70 II. App. 3d 42, 388 N.E.2d 436 (2d Dist. 1979); Avco Fin. Co. v.
Erickson, 132 Ill. App. 2d 868, 270 N.E.2d 111 (1963); Personal Fin. Co. of Chicago v. Silver, 327 Ill. App. 554, 64 N.E.2d 398 (1946).
For Illinois cases allowing post-discharge attachment of a prefiling lien to
property clearly acquired after bankruptcy (under pre-Code law) see Mallin v.
Wenham, 209 Ill. 252, 70 N.E. 564 (1904); Wales v. Bogue, 31 M1.464 (1863).
76. See Pub. L. No. 91-467, Stat. 990 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of
11 U.S.C.); note especially 11 U.S.C. § 14(f) (1976) (repealed 1978). See also H.R.
Ru. No. 91-1502, 91st Cong., 2d Ses. (1970) [hereinafter H. REP.]; S. REP. No.
91-1173, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). For a comprehensive discussion of the devel-
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discharge was viewed as an affirmative defense which a bankrupt
could timely plead to resist subsequent civil actions brought in
state court for satisfaction of discharged debt." To further guarantee the Act's intended fresh start policy, the drafters of the 1970
Amendments viewed the discharge as an injunction barring creditors from later proceeding against the debtor in personam. 78 These
amendments did not, however, affect the rights of a lien creditor
proceeding post-discharge against the bankrupt's property. In
opment and scope of these amendments see Countryman, The New DischargeabilityLaws, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1971).
77. Because of its limited scope, the bankrupt's discharge was often ineffective in resisting various means of subsequent attack. As one commentator described it:
Under the previous [pre-1970 Amendments] law, the effect of a discharge
was generally left to litigation and determination in the state courts upon
the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding. Unfortunately, in the past,
debtors commonly relied upon the discharge as an automatic protection
device and failed to obtain legal counsel to appear on their behalf in actions brought by creditors. A discharge constituted an affirmative defense
and was waived if not properly pleaded. Default judgments were frequently entered. In many cases, the debtor having just emerged from a
bankruptcy proceeding found himself financially unable to retain counsel. In other situations, service of the complaint or summons upon the
discharged debtor was defective (perhaps deliberately) to such extent
that the debtor, in fact, received no notice of the institution of the suit
against him. Moreover, even with legal assistance, there were instances in
which the bankrupt lost the full protection of the law through the inexperience of state judges in bankruptcy matters; but this no doubt occurred for the most part at the magisterial level in respect to small
claims.
Forman, Application of the New DischargeabilityLaw of 1970 to Corporations
and Chapter XI, 46 AM. BANKR. L.J. 105, 105-06 (1972). See also Countryman,
supra note 76, at 17-19.
78. See H. REP, supra note 76, at 1-2.
79. As amended, § 14 of the Act was supplemented to include subsection (f),
which read as follows:
An order of discharge shall(1) declare that any judgment theretofore or thereafter obtained in any
other court is null and void as a determination of the personal liability
of the bankrupt with respect to any of the following:
(a) debts not excepted from the discharge under subdivision (a) of
section 17 of this Act [Debts not Affected by Discharge]; (b) debts
discharged under paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of section 17 of
this Act [for failure to timely file complaint to determine dischargeability]; and (c) debts determined to be discharged under
paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) of section 17 of this Act [claims of
nondischargeability denied]; and
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sum, the rights of a lien creditor proceeding in rem, as distinguished from in personam, were not the subject of substantial
change until enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.80 The
Code section relevant to the effect of discharge is section 524(a),
which provides in pertinent part:
A discharge in a case under this title(1) avoids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent
that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of
the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727,
944, 1141, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such
debt is waived;
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or
continuation of an action, the employment of process, or any act,
to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of
the debtor, or from property of the debtor, whether or not dis-

charge of such debt is waived.81

While providing further protection of a debtor's rights in personam (notably by essentially eliminating creditor recourse
through means of self-help),8s a discharge now also serves to substantially restrict post-bankruptcy collection efforts in rem. 88 Both
of these additions to the scope of the discharge injunction are expressed in section 524(a)(2)." As to post-discharge lien survival,
limitation is provided by the deceptively simple phrase "property
of the debtor."8 5 One view86 is that inclusion of this phrase in sec(2) enjoin all creditors whose debts are discharged from thereafter instituting or continuing any action or employing any process to collect such

debts as personal liabilities of the bankrupt.
11 U.S.C. § 14(f) (1976) (repealed 1978) (emphasis supplied). The scope of this
extension is limited to restraint of collection efforts as a personal liability of the
debtor. See Ostrow, supra note 72, at 407-10.
80. See Ostrow, supra note 72, at 409-13.

81. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (emphasis supplied).
82. H. REP., supra note 4, at 365-66; see also COLLIER, supra note 3, at
524.01.
83. Even as amended, § 14 of the Bankruptcy Act only enjoined creditors
from attempting to collect discharged debts "as personal liabilities of the bankrupt." 11 U.S.C. § 14(f) (1976) (repealed 1978). Absent avoidance, the post-discharge survival and enforceability of prefiling liens created under state law remained largely a question of state law. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.

Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 590 (1935); Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 621 (1886). See
also Ostrow, supra note 72, at 405-06.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2); see also supra text accompanying note 81.

85. Id.

86. In re Williams, 9 Bankr. 228 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
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tion 524(a)(2) bars post-discharge attachment of a pre-filing lien to
any property of the debtor absent a binding reaffirmation.87 Yet
reading the phrase within the full context of the Bankruptcy Code
leads to a narrower interpretation. If the discharge serves as a total
injunction against post-bankruptcy lien attachment, section
522(c),80 which perpetuates the rule of Long v. Bullard," could not
logically permit any post-bankruptcy lien survival.90 The purpose
87. It was the conclusion of the Williams court that the lien could not survive without the continuance of the underlying obligation; hence, the requirement
of reaffirmation. Id. at 234-35. Under the reaffirmation provisions of the Code, a
debtor may solicit the continued enforceability of a pre-filing debt as a personal
obligation notwithstanding discharge. Normally, the debtor's primary motivation
is to discourage a creditor with security in the debtor's posession from executing
or foreclosing upon the security. The satisfaction of certain added requirements,
and court approval of the reaffirmation agreement is required except where a consumer debt secured by real property is involved, in which case the court does no
more than advise the debtor as to the legal consequences of the agreement. 11
U.S.C. § 524(c), (d). While the absence of reaffirmation would not affect a mortgagee's rights in rem, where the debtor is in default, the debtor's willingness to reaffirm may be an effective means to dissuade a mortgagee otherwise intending to
foreclose. On reaffirmations generally see In re Cruseturner, 8 Bankr. 581 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1981); DeWoskin, A Warning to Attorneys: Reaffirmation Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 85 COM. L.J. 297 (1980); Mapother, Bankruptcy Strategies for Representing Creditors in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Cases, 86 COM. L.J.
133 (1981).
88. Section 522(c) provides:
(c) Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this section is
not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose,
or that is determined under section 502 of this title as if such claim had
arisen before the commencement of the case, except(1) a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a)(1) or section
523(a)(5) of this title; or
(2) a lien that is(A) not avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a)
of this title;
(B) not voided under section 506(d) of this title; or
(C)(i) a tax lien, notice of which is properly filed; and
(ii) avoided under section 545(2) of this title.
See 3 COLLIER, supra note 3, at 1 522.27; see also id. at 1 522.29.
89. Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886). See also infra note 90.
90. As stated in the House Report on section 522(c):
The bankruptcy discharge will not prevent enforcement of valid liens.
The rule of Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886), is accepted with respect
to the enforcement of valid liens on nonexempt property as well as on
exempt property. Cf. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295
U.S. 555, 583 (1935).
H. REP., supra note 4, at 361. Section 522(c), then, simply recognizes the contin-
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in avoiding judicial liens and nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
security interests under section 522(f) would also be called into
question.9 1 Such an expanded interpretation of the discharge injunction would also undermine section 506(d), for even as a curative provision," there would be no need to void liens if the injunction precluded attachment post-discharge to any property held by
the debtor. Title problems, absent reaffirmation, would be cured
automatically by entry of the discharge order."s If for no reasons
other than consistent statutory interpretation" and recognition of
Congressional intent to permit post-bankruptcy survival of valid
liens," the discharge injunction cannot serve as a total bar to postdischarge lien survival."' Some property of the debtor must remain
ued validity of liens which are not avoided by the trustee or the debtor exercising
the trustee's avoidance powers, or voided under § 506(d). See supra notes 40-42
and accompanying text. Recognition of this validity is not affected by whether or
not the property subject to the lien is exempt.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0; see also app. to this article.
92. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
93. If the discharge automatically voided valid liens which were to some extent unsatisfied at the time the discharge order was entered, then, whatever their
nature br origin, they would be null and void and of no future effect. These automatically voided liens would come to be viewed by title companies, etc., as even
less than clearable clouds on title. This is decidedly not the case. See supra notes
88-92 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 90-96.
94. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(d), 522(c). See also id. § 522(f) and app. to this
article; id. § 362(a)(5) and discussion of this subsection infra at notes 99 & 122.
95. As stated in relevant part in the House Report on section 506(d):
Section 506(d) permits liens to pass through the bankruptcy case unaffected. However, if a party in interest requests the court to determine
and allow or disallow the claim secured by the lien under section 502 and
the claim is not allowed, then the lien is void to the extent that the claim
is not allowed.
H. REP., supra note 4, at 357. See also id. at 361.
96. If the lien remains unaffected by the bankruptcy proceeding, it is implicit
that the property securing it remains at least to some extent attachable. Id. See
also id. at 365-66. For authority concluding that liens not invalidated during the
proceeding survive bankruptcy see In re Greenley, 7 Bankr. 9 (Bankr. D. Del.
1980); In re Spendal, 15 Bankr. 698 (Bankr. D. Mo. 1981); In re Weathers, 5 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 935 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); (see also the extensive
case list id. at 939).

For a Circuit Court of Appeals case recognizing these principles, yet denying
post-discharge continuance of a wage assignment see In re Soto, 5 COLLIER
BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 1277, 1279 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1981). See also Ostrow, supra
note 72, at 405; Shanor, supra note 72; 9A AM. JuR. 2D Bankruptcy (2d ed. 1980);
1 NORTON BANKR. LAW AND PRACTICE (1981); 3 COLLIER, supra note 3, at 1 524.01;
D. COWANS, COWANs BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE T 8.3 (Interim ed. 1980)
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attachable after discharge.
Given the case and commentary, albeit limited, that has attempted to interpret and define the phrase "property of the
debtor" as included in section 524(a)(2), a consensus seems to have
emerged concluding that the protective scope of the phrase is limited to property of the debtor acquired subsequent to filing for relief in bankruptcy. 7 With a few limited exceptions,"8 property of
the debtor is bifurcated by the discharge into two categories"
[hereinafter cited as COWANS].
97. COWANS, supra note 96.
98. There are limited exceptions which bring property other than that which
existed at the time of filing into the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5),
541(a)(6). There is also an exception recognizing after-acquired property clauses

in article 9 security interests under U.C.C. § 9-204. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b); see

also H. REP. supra note 4, at 376-77.
99. This bifurcating effect is best indicated by the following sections of the
Code. With respect to consensual liens, § 552(a) provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the
case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the case.
See also H. REP., supra note 4, at 376-77. Subsection (b) generally excepts as
enforceable the extension of a security agreement to proceeds and property in the
nature of proceeds. Id.
To prevent attachment of a pre-filing lien to post-petition property of the
debtor during the pendency of the bankrupcty proceeding, § 362(a)(5) provides as
follows:
[A] petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title operates as a
stay, applicable to all entities, of(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title ....
This section operates to protect property which the debtor acquires after the petition is filed and until such time as the case is closed, dismissed or the debtor is
discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c). As such, it protects property of the debtor from
the attachment of pre-filing liens which can attach, if proper procedure is followed, to pre-petition property. Id. § 362(d). While property of the debtor by
virtue of exemption and property under § 522(b) remain potentially attachable,
property acquired by the debtor after the petition is filed is free from the attachment of pre-filing liens. As stated in the House Report:
Paragraph (5) stays any act to create or enforce a lien against property of
the debtor, that is, most property that is acquired after the date of the
filing of the petition, property that is exempted, or property that does
not pass to the estate, to the extent that the lien secures a prepetition
claim. Again, to permit post bankruptcy lien creation or enforcement
would permit certain creditors to receive preferential treatment. It may
also circumvent the debtor's discharge.
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which may be termed pre- and post-petition property. Pre-petition
property is, of course, amenable to liquidation and distribution,
notably by lien enforcement. 101 Post-petition property is not. 10'
Simply stated, post-petition or after-acquired property is that
which is protected by the phrase "property of the debtor" in section 524(a)(2).' 0 ' However, if it is true that the discharge injunction shields property acquired by the debtor after filing against
03
post-discharge lien attachment, the critical question remains:1 Of
what real benefit is it to void an unsecured lien under section
506(d)?
THE

506(d)/524(a)2 INTERPLAY: INSIDE THE DISCHARGE INJUNCTION

To illustrate the interplay of sections 524(a)(2) and 506(d),
and how section 524(a)(2) may limit the property to which a lien
not voided during the bankruptcy proceeding may later attach
post-bankruptcy, consider the following:10
Sometime after the discharge order is entered:
$50,000 Value of Real Estate (up from $40,000 at filing)
22,500 Mortgage (down from $30,000 at filing)
7,500 Homestead Exemption
Results in $20,000 Equity (product of originally non-exempt equity plus property appreciation plus mortgage
reduction)
Threatened by $100,000 Recorded Judgment Lien
Assume further that the debtor has acquired an additional
H. REP., supra note 4, at 341. Among other things, it is post-petition property
which this section safeguards from attachment by pre-filing liens during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. See also COWANS, supra note 96, at § 9.5.

100. On the enforcement of secured claims during the bankruptcy proceeding
see generally Jalbert, Abandonments Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 86 COM.
L.J. 359 (1981). See also In re Calabria, 5 Bankr. 73 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980); 11

U.S.C. § 362(d); Mednick, Some Effects of the New Bankruptcy Code on Creditors with Secured Claims in Residential Real Property, 86 CoM. L.J. 291 (1981);
supra note 99.
101. See COWANS, supra note 96, at § 9.5. See also supra note 99.
102. As one leading authority describes it: "[P]roperty of the debtor in sec-

tion 524(a)(2) necessarily refers to property acquired by the debtor after the filing
of the petition commencing the title 11 case." 3

COLLIER,

supra note 3, at

524.01. While Collier and the statement noted are consistent with current author-

ity, what is in fact post-petition or after-acquired property requires closer analysis. See supra note 96; infra notes 104-57.

103. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
104. Based on the continuing fact pattern last presented at note 67.
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parcel of real estate (value: $20,000) from income earned
subsequent to filing bankruptcy.
Here there are three different sources of what arguably may be
considered after-acquired property. These are (a) equity arising
from post-petition property appreciation; 105 (b) the equity arising
from mortgage reduction;1 08 and (c) the separate parcel of real es7
tate clearly acquired after bankruptcy. 1
While obviously not after-acquired property, there is also
$2500 equity which was non-exemptible at the time of bankruptcy. 0 8 While the judicial lien was then unsecured in the amount
of $97,500,109 the debtor did not bring an action under section
506(d) to void. 110 To what extent and to which of these sources of

105. Based on the current fact pattern, $10,000. [Hereinafter, any reference
to property appreciation, post-petition property appreciation or the like will be in
reference to appreciation in the value of real estate developing in the post-filing
period, i.e., after the petition in bankruptcy was filed.] Note also that property
appreciation may be intangible or tangible, resulting from value appreciation due
to market conditions or physical improvement such as an addition to the debtor's
home. Generally, the discussion of property appreciation following is addressed to
appreciation in the intangible sense, though there are subtle distinctions regarding tangible property appreciation which will be noted. See infra note 121.
106. Based on the current fact pattern, $7,500. Mortgage reduction is the
most common example of what is hereinafter referred to, in general discussion, as
the reduction of a senior secured claim. A senior secured claim is a claim which is
at least partially secured in bankruptcy with priority over a subordinate claim. 11
U.S.C. § 506(a).
107. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
108. The $2,500 was, of course, attachable during the bankruptcy proceeding.
See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
109. Note that under current Illinois law, an individual debtor may now exempt only $7,500 for homestead. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 52, § 1. See supra note 61.
110. Again, the $2,500 was attachable during the bankruptcy proceeding. Because there was no value available for distribution to unsecured creditors, the
trustee did nothing to dispose of the property. See, e.g., Standard Brass Corp. v.
Farmers Nat'l Bank, 388 F.2d 86, 89 (7th Cir. 1967) (trustee abused discretion by
selling property free of lien when sale returned no equity to bankrupt's estate).
But see also 11 U.S.C. § 725. By inadvertence or with the intention of enforcing
his lien later, the judgment creditor did not assert a claim as secured in bankruptcy. With no assets available for distribution to unsecured claims, the judgment creditor's claim remains unsatisfied and the debtor's personal liability is discharged. Id. §§ 524(a), 727(a). See also H. REP., supra note 4, at 365-66. Note that
absent felease of judgment, it would seem that, even if the debtor had negotiated
the judgment creditor's non-enforcement of the judgment lien by reaffirmation,
the lien would continue under the narrow view of the discharge injunction even as
to the unsatisfied portion. See supra note 87. See also infra notes 113-17, 126-35
and accompanying text.
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value might the lien now attach?
Clearly, after-acquired property would include that which was
physically acquired post-bankruptcy with assets gained independent of the bankruptcy.11 ' Within this category, the additional parcel of real estate should be considered "property of the debtor"
protected from attachment of a pre-filing lien by the veil of the
discharge injunction.1 1' Beyond this after-acquired property and
its attendant protection, categorization becomes speculative. Credible arguments yielding opposite results can be made.
Guided by little more than the obscure language of section
524(a)(2)," 8 focus now turns to property remaining in the debtor's
possession' which passed through the bankruptcy proceeding.
Value arising in this property during the post-filing period through
appreciation or reduction of senior secured claims may arguably be
considered either equity reachable by pre-filing liens not avoided
during the bankruptcy proceedings, or "property of the debtor"
protected by the discharge injunction. Specifically, do these
sources result in new value reachable by a lien which survived
bankruptcy because it was not avoided by operation of section
506(d)?"s
First, the appreciation in value of the residence will be considered. While the increase in value accrued in the post-filing period
may, in one sense, be considered after-acquired and thus "property
of the debtor," the fact that it is pre-petition property which is
111. See authority cited supra at note 96.

112. Property independent of the bankruptcy proceeding-in the sense that
it was obtained by the debtor post-bankruptcy by purchase, gift or devise-may
be considered truly after-acquired and within the protective scope of the discharge injunction. For example, an automobile purchased sometime after bankruptcy with income earned by the debtor after bankruptcy or a similarly pur-

chased parcel of real estate would fit this description. This is why at least some
property potentially subject to a lien's attachment must pass through bankruptcy
for the lien to survive as inchoate yet potentially viable. Thus, for a lien to survive
in a viable capacity, some potentially attachable property must pass through
bankruptcy. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
113. See supra text accompanying note 81.
114. E.g., the debtor's residence in the fact pattern supra at text accompanying note 104.
115. Stated another way, if "property of the debtor" protected by the injunction from post-discharge attachment of pre-filing liens is only that property acquired after the petition is filed, what exactly is after-acquired property? Research has disclosed no case, no legislative history and no commentary by treatise

or article directly on point. See supra note 96 and infra note 122. See also infra
notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
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accreting must be acknowledged. 1 Whether this derivation is sufficient to bring the value arising from the appreciation beyond the
scope of the discharge injunction-consequently rendering it attachable post-discharge by a pre-filing lien-poses a question left
o
unanswered by a reading of section 524(a).
Turning to value arising from post-filing reduction of senior
secured claims, the connection to pre-petition property is even
more distinct. In this instance, it is actually pre-petition property
which is being freed post-bankruptcy, in the sense that value
which existed prior to and at the time of bankruptcy is simply being unencumbered post-bankruptcy. Because this value, although
encumbered, was actually part of the property both before and
during bankruptcy, an argument can be made that later reducing
senior secured claims to the property should permit an otherwise
subordinated pre-filing lien (such as the judicial lien above) to attach because it was not invalidated during the bankruptcy
proceeding.
The values arising from post-filing appreciation and the reduction of senior secured claims may relate to pre-filing property
-property subject to the prior bankruptcy proceeding- sufficient
to permit attachment post-discharge of a pre-filing lien. Therefore,
where a debtor fails to have a lien voided during the bankruptcy
proceeding to the extent it is unsecured, an argument can be made
that the lien survives in an inchoate capacity, eventually to attach
to the debtor's peril against such property. Particularly in the case
of value arising from reduction of senior secured claims, the argument is even more compelling because this value, encumbered at
the time of bankruptcy, is pre-petition property in the sense that it
existed at the time of bankruptcy. In sum, post-petition appreciation of pre-petition property, and particularly value subsequently
freed by post-petition reduction of senior secured claims, might
not be considered "property of the debtor" protected by the discharge injunction because (1) it is not truly physically after-acquired property and (2) it is too connected to pre-petition property
to be considered after-acquired. So viewed, the appreciation would
not warrant discharge protection from attachment of valid prefiling liens such as the judicial lien above. 117 This may be consid116. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.

117. Unless avoided by the trustee or the debtor pursuant, under limited cir-

cumstances, to the trustee's avoidance powers, or voided by the debtor (or a
"party in interest") under § 506(d), the lien remains valid. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c),
522(h). For text of § 522(c) see supra note 88. See also supra notes 41-42 and
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ered the narrowest scope of the injunction arising from the phrase
"property of the debtor" in section 524(a)(2).
To further complicate the identification of what property is
protected by the discharge, 118 an argument also can be made for
broadening the scope of the discharge injunction to protect value
such as that arising from post-filing property appreciation and the
reduction of senior secured claims. Certainly, more consistent with
congressional intent to further the debtor's opportunity for a fresh
start,11 9 this view of the discharge provision may be stated as follows: If a source of value develops after the bankruptcy is
filed 2 0-regardless of whether it develops through post-petition
property appreciation, the reduction of senior secured claims or
the acquisition of a completely new res-it did develop in the postfiling period. Regardless of the source, (since the value inured to
the benefit of the debtor post-bankruptcy) it could logically be
considered after-aquired property. As such, it would be "property
of the debtor" protected by the discharge injunction and, hence,
not attachable by a pre-filing lien. This may be considered the
broadest scope of the injunction arising from the phrase "property
1 21
of the debtor" in section 524(a)(2).
accompanying text. See also COLLIER, supra note 3, at 522.27 & n.1.
118. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
119. See H. REP., supra note 4, at 117-18, 125-26, 128, 362, 366, 384. See also
S. REP., supra note 4, at 7, 76, 81, 98.
120. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
121. Of special interest in this context, value which arises from reduction of
senior secured claims again evidences a unique quality which, paradoxically,
seems to render it, in contrast to value arising from intangible property appreciation, especially amenable to treatment as after-acquired property. See discussion
supra at text following note 116. See also supra note 105. Simply stated, where
the income used to reduce senior secured claims was generated in the post-petition period, a further argument can be made that the equity (value) arising in this
respect is more likely to be considered after-acquired or post-petition property
because it is the product of income acquired in the post-petition period. In this
way it is more closely connected to the debtor's post-bankruptcy efforts than coincidental property appreciation. Arguably, the debtor is simply converting the
form of after-acquired property by transferring it from income to equity in real
estate rather than to equity in, for example, a new car. If the car clearly would be
after-acquired, it is arguable that the newly-acquired equity should be considered
after-acquired as well.
While the distinction may appear overly subtle, value arising from the reduction of a senior secured claim, along with truly after-acquired property, would be
protected by the discharge injunction as "property of the debtor" while value
arising from intangible property appreciation would not. These same arguments
would apply to tangible property appreciation to the extent that it is also derived
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When the potential post-discharge consequences to the debtor
whose counsel neglects to void a lien avoidable under section
506(d) are considered, it can readily be seen that conjecture concerning the proper interpretation of the phrase "property of the
debtor" in section 524(a)(2) is more than academic. 22 If a court
were to adopt what has been referred to as the broadest possible
scope of the discharge injunction for post-discharge lien survival," 8
then despite debtor's failure to obtain a section 506(d) determination during the pendency of the earlier bankruptcy proceeding,
where a wholly or partially unsecured lien remains outstanding
against the estate, the lien's post-bankruptcy attachment would
yield no more than its attachment would have during the bankruptcy proceeding. Of course, enforcement of the wholly unsecured
lien, as measured at the time of bankruptcy, would yield nothing.12 4 Yet, regardless of when enforcement was attempted, the attachment of a partially unsecured lien would realize only its original value as a secured claim.

2

Based on the facts above,

from income generated in the post-bankruptcy period. Might this be considered
the intermediary scope of the injunction arising from the phrase "property of the
debtor" in § 524(a)(2)?
122. The phrase "property of the debtor" also appears in other sections of
the Code. Yet the phrase as used therein provides no useful comparison to aid in
discovering the underlying meaning of the phrase in the discharge context. As
used in § 362(a)(5), the phrase brings "property of the debtor" within the protection of the automatic stay during the pending bankruptcy proceeding. "Property
of the debtor" protected by the stay is "property of the debtor" later protected by
the discharge injunction; for generally, property of the debtor coming into the
bankruptcy becomes property of the estate, at least initially. See 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(1). Section 362(a)(5), in the event a discharge is obtained, simply leaves off
where § 524(a)(2) begins. Automatically, the Code provides a continuous blanket
to protect "property of the debtor." Yet, § 362(a)(5) provides no useful clue as to
what constitutes "property of the debtor." Whatever it is, it is, at least, afteracquired. See H. REP., supra note 4, at 341. See also 11 U.S.C. § 552(b).
123. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
124. Id. The discharge injunction, if interpreted broadly to protect property,
whatever its nature, if acquired by the debtor after filing, would leave nothing
attachable post-discharge by a lien which was wholly unsecured at the time of
bankruptcy. See supra notes 16-42 and accompanying text.
125. The broadest possible scope of the discharge injunction shields all conceivable types of property, subject only to the condition that it be acquired by the
debtor in the post-filing period. This view of the discharge is the most philosophically consistent with the fresh start policy underlying bankruptcy law. See Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 243 (1934) (quoted supra at note 7). However,
from a practical point of view it is also the most troublesome. Viewed broadly, the
discharge permits only post-discharge attachment of that property or value which
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attachment of the judicial lien would realize $2500, which is simply
the value of its original security.
Turning to the narrower view of the discharge injunction,
the debtor's problems appear far more troublesome. If a court
adopts this narrower view, a once largely unsecured and avoidable
lien returns to haunt the debtor. Based on the facts above, this
result would follow from attempted enforcement of the judicial
27
lien:1
as to originally non-exempt equity, the
judgment lien attaches
$2,500
as to value arising from mortgage reduction,
the judgment lien attaches
7,500
as to value arising from appreciation of
residence, the judgment lien attaches
10,0
$20,000128
Satisfaction of judgment lien realizes
was attachable at the time of bankruptcy. While values ($2,500 attachable in this
instance), are easily conjured up in the creation of a hypothetical, in the real
world they may be quite difficult to ascertain. If determined under § 506 (e.g., in a
§ 506(d) proceeding), a valuation hearing would often be necessary. See supra
note 21. Far more difficult, particularly because of property appreciation, would
be a later determination when values at the time of bankruptcy have not been
formally established, if the relevant values were those existent at the time of
bankruptcy. Since post-petition acquisitions in the nature of value would not be
attachable under the broad view of the discharge injunction, a post-bankruptcy
determination would have to relate back to determine relevant values. In this context, the value-fixing function of § 506(d) appears invaluable. See supra note 69.
Under the narrow view of the discharge injunction, since value arising from property passing through the bankruptcy remains attachable, valuation would not
pose a special problem. The relevant values would always be those existing at the
time of attachment.
126. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
127. Enforcement would arise where the judgment creditor affirmatively asserts his lien, probably leading to involuntary sale, or where debtor attempts to
sell.
128. Computed as follows:
Value of real estate
$50,000
Less amount due on mortgage
22,500
Equity remaining after
satisfaction of mortgage
$27,500
Less debtor's claim of homestead
7,500
Equity remaining after
satisfaction of mortgage and
homestead
$20,000
Judgment lien
100,000
May attach to (product of the
20,000
originally attachable $2,500 plus
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Though the discharge injunction would prevent attachment of
other property of the debtor,"" a problem may remain (even after
the partial satisfaction) with the judicial lien surviving and similarly attaching to the residence in the future if the debtor satisfies
the current claim without sale.18 0 Even where the debtor sells the
property to make the satisfaction, the judgment lien might seriously impair the value of the real estate and lead to title problems
forcing quit-claim or involuntary sale. 13 1 If the judgment lienholder
sought to have the case reopened under section 350(b) of the
Code 3 2 to pursue attachment in bankruptcy court, would the court
allow the debtor to bring a section 506(d) action to void the unsecured balance of the lien? Could the debtor have the case reopened? 38 This may depend upon whether or not the judgment
$10,000 property appreciation and
$7,500 reduction of mortgage)
(Based on the fact pattern presented at note 67). See also supra note 52 and app.
to this article.
129. See supra note 96. See also supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
130. Assuming full encumbrance of the debtor's additional real estate (i.e.,
the additional after-acquired parcel in the fact pattern at text following note 104),
even this unpleasant situation (at least from the debtor's point of view), assumes
ready cash or unsecured financing to obtain satisfaction of the judgment creditor's
current claim. Surely vexed, and probably with the assistance of new counsel, the
debtor may attempt to obtain additional financing secured by the residence to
accomplish satisfaction of the judgment. As the judgment lien would have priority
over a mortgage negotiated at this point, the debtor would experience great difficulty in obtaining such financing. Without negotiating a release for partial satisfaction of the outstanding judgment ($20,000), the debtor will lose his home.
131. Under these circumstances, absent release of judgment, the debtor cannot convey warranty deed. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 8-9 (1969 & West. Supp.
1981-1982).
132. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) provides that "[a] case may be reopened in the court
in which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor,
or for other cause." See also BANKR. R. 515.
133. BANKR. R. 515. A somewhat analogous situation was presented in In re
Montney, 8 BANKR. CT. Dzc. (CCR) 931, 934 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982), where the
court reopened the case to allow the debtor to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest on household goods under § 522(0(2). See also In
re Swanson, 13 Bankr. 851 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1981). But see In re Adkins, 7 Bankr.
325 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980). Perhaps an even stronger argument could be made
for reopening the case to allow the debtor to proceed under § 506(d) because,
unlike the almost routine use of § 522(f) when applicable, § 506(d) still appears to
be a largely overlooked remedy. See supra note 5. Yet, despite the result reached
by the Montney court, at least when proceeding under § 506(d) becomes more
commonly accepted in practice, the equities will not clearly favor the debtor
where the section was not utilized at the time of bankruptcy. An argument could

[ 1982:2851

POST-DISCHARGE LIEN SURVIVAL

lienholder first seeks enforcement of his claim in state court.1"4

Given the post-bankruptcy increase in value, if lien avoidance was
to be reconsidered, the court might look to the values current during the original bankruptcy proceeding and void the judicial lien to
the extent of $97,500. On the other hand, might the court allow the
partial .patisfaction and then void the lien in the amount of
$80,000?135

These issues may, at best, be a summary review of problems
arising post-bankruptcy where section 506(d) was not utilized in
the original proceeding. The debtor is faced with raising defenses
in litigation which the discharge was hoped to obviate. 13 6 However,
the equities involved in these situations do not so clearly favor the
debtor; a creditor obviously could not be expected to pursue the
137
avoidance of his own lien.
In this context, section 506(d) can clearly be seen as a debtor's
remedy, which the debtor affirmatively is obliged to pursue in the
original proceeding. At worst, a once inchoate lien may rise from
dormancy and attach to debtor's property, turning the debtor
again in a downward spiral toward bankruptcy. The possibilities
certainly represent substantial impairment of that chance to be
provided by bankruptcy law: to permit the debtor "a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt."' 38 Where so
be made that failure to bring a § 506(d) action before the case is closed is a waiver
of the debtor's rights under the section. Certainly the burden of voiding the lien is
on the debtor, for clearly a creditor cannot be expected to void his own lien, particularly in the face of the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). See also 28 U.S.C. §
1930(b); COWANS, supra note 96, at § 8.8. But see supra note 3.
134. This would not appear to be in violation of the discharge injunction
where the action is brought only against property passing through bankruptcy, as
distinguished from that clearly after-acquired, particularly given the ambiguity
otherwise surrounding the scope of the injunction. But see COLLIER, supra note 3,
at 11 524.7-.8.
135. Under the narrow view of the discharge injunction, the lien would be
voided in the amount of $80,000, as relevant values would be determined at the
time of post-discharge attachment. Under the broad view, the lien would be
voided in the amount of $97,500, assuming the court could determine the values
existent at the time of bankruptcy. See supra note 125.
136. See H. REP., supra note 4, at 365 where it is stated, "[T]he injunction is
to give complete effect to the discharge and to eliminate any doubt concerning the
effect of the discharge as a total prohibition on debt collection efforts."
137. See supra note 133. See also D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 69 (Supp. 1979).
138. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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easily obviated by conscientious practice during the bankruptcy
proceeding, such impairment of the fresh start policy should not be
condoned."
Though uncertainty remains an element in any interpretation
of the phrase "property of the debtor" as found in section
524(a)(2), there is limited authority to support what has been referred to as the narrowest scope of the discharge injunction within
the context of section 506(d) proceedings.1 40 The case of In re Pitre, " I while decided on other grounds,14 ' discussed in dicta the effect of lien avoidance under section 506(d) as follows:
Under section 506(d), to the extent that a lien secures a claim
that is not a secured claim under section 506(a), such lien is void.
Section 506 looks to the value of the property at the time of
bankruptcy and sets the creditor's secured claim and thereby the
amount of its lien for all time. Its effect is to prevent the creditor
with a security interest in property with a value at the time of
bankruptcy which is less than the amount of his claim from realizing future benefits as a secured creditor as a result of the property subsequently appreciating or as a result of the debtor making
payments on claims with priority secured by the same property.14z
Pitre lends support to the narrow interpretation of the discharge
injunction. If the lien is not avoided during the bankruptcy proceeding, notably under section 506(d) for lack of supporting security, it may later attach to value arising from post-filing appreciation and reduction of senior secured claims against property which
was subject to attachment by the lien during the bankruptcy
1 44

proceeding.

In the most expansive discussion of section 506(d) to date, the
court in In re Tanner allowed the debtor's complaint to have a
third mortgage declared void as unsecured.14 5 A judicial lien in the
third position would have produced the same result.14 6 Curiously,
139. Note that even if a case is reopened to subsequently void a lien under §
506(d), it is only to the extent it is unsecured. Under the narrow view of the
discharge injunction, lien enforcement would impair the debtor's fresh start to the
extent it attaches to value which was unavailable at the time of bankruptcy. See
supra notes 128 & 130. See also infra note 148 and accompanying text.

140.
141.
142.
143.

See supra notes 116-17, 126-29 and accompanying text.
See In re Pitre, 11 Bankr. 777 (Bankr. N.D. m. 1981).
Id. at 780-81.
Id. at 781.

144. Id.

145. See In re Tanner, 14 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981).
146. Id. at 935.
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the court noted that "[a]ppreciation of property or an increase of
equity ownership by the reduction of an outstanding mortgage are
examples of after-acquired property which are attributable to the
debtor's post-bankruptcy efforts."' 147 So perceived, it would seem
implicit that the Tanner court views these as examples of afteracquired property protected post-discharge by section 524(a)(2).
Without more, this could be considered support for the broader
view of the discharge injunction and hence, property not vulnerable to post-discharge attachment by a lien which survived bankruptcy. Yet the court goes on to state that "[i]f a real property
mortgage is not avoided to the extent it is unsecured, a pre-petition creditor will impair the debtor's fresh start by partaking in his
post-petition property acquisitions."I s As the lien could not be
said to attach to property protected by the discharge injunction, In
re Tanner serves to support the view that only property clearly
acquired in the physical sense after bankruptcy is veiled by the
discharge injunction
from post-bankruptcy attachment of pre1 49
liens.
filing
CONCLUSION

Like section 506(d), section 524(a) is new to bankruptcy law.
Certainly with respect to prescribing the extent of the continued
enforceability of liens passing through bankruptcy, no comparable
restriction existed under the Bankruptcy Act.160 For this reason, it
distinguishes the bulk of case law decided under the former Act, 51
147. Id. at 936.
148. Id.
149. Note also the following comment:

To the exent that traditional notions regarding the nature of the discharge have survived, courts may strictly construe the new prohibitions
against actions aimed at recovering discharged debts and hold that unless the new Code expressly prohibits a particular undertaking, the undertaking is permitted.
Ostrow, supra note 72, at 414; see also id. at 409-10.

150. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 14(f) (1976) (repealed 1978) (only enjoined collection of

discharged debts "as personal liabilities of the bankrupt"). See supra notes 72, 83.
151. Cases allowing post-bankruptcy attachment, in accord with state law, of
truly after-acquired property are clearly superceded by the language "property of

the debtor" in § 524(a)(2). See supra note 75; see also supra notes 111-12 and
accompanying text. Cases allowing post-bankruptcy attachment of a pre-filing
lien, in accord with state law, to property passing through bankruptcy subject to
the lien are cast in doubt by the ambiguity inherent in the phrase "property of
the debtor." See supra note 75. See also supra notes 113-149 and accompanying
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excepting only that which acknowledged post-discharge lien survival in the instance where property subject to the lien passes
through the bankruptcy estate. 5 2 However, despite the weight of
importance which the operative phrase "property of the debtor"
has for potentially secured claims in bankruptcy, its true meaning
is lost in ambiguity.
Due to the vagueness and varying interpretations possible, the
author intends to draw no fixed conclusion as to the phrase's full
scope. Congress needs to spell out clearly what protection is provided by the discharge injunction as it applies to problems stemming from post-discharge lien survival. Until such clarification is
forthcoming, section 524(a)(2) remains the debtor's only shield
post-discharge to bar attachment of liens which survive bankruptcy against what may be considered the products of the
debtor's fresh start. Section 524(a)(2) is, therefore, of great significance and should serve well to protect property of the debtor
which is clearly after-acquired.
Beyond this, the scope of the injunction is unclear. Logically,
it should protect value invested in property passing through bankruptcy in the same manner as it protects value invested in completely new property, for both investments derive from income
generated in the post-bankruptcy period.'
Similarly, it should
protect value arising by post-bankruptcy appreciation of property
passing through the estate. While this would be the most
philosphically consistent view,' 5 the more commonly accepted interpretation of the discharge injunction greatly narrows its scope,
preventing only attachment of property in the truly after-acquired
sense.
text.

152. See also supra notes 113-49 and accompanying text. Of course, general
principles not in conflict with the Bankruptcy Code are not disturbed. From an
often-quoted case, the following statement may be considered a far-sighted preview of the development of the bankruptcy discharge:
An adjudication of bankruptcy, followed by a discharge, releases a debtor
from all previously incurred debts .

.

. and it logically cannot be sup-

posed that the act nevertheless intended to keep such debts alive for the
purpose of permitting the creation of an enforceable lien upon a subject
not existent when the bankruptcy became effective or even arising from,
or connected with, pre-existing property, but brought into being solely as
the fruit of the subsequent labor of the bankrupt.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 243 (1934).
153. See supra notes 118-22, 124 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 125.
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Considering the narrower interpretation of the discharge as
the currently more popular of possibilities discussed, the discharge
injunction remains incomplete. It does not protect the debtor's
fresh start from potential setback caused by post-bankruptcy assertion of surviving pre-filing liens. If prior practice is disregarded
to the extent that it conflicts with that which is clearly protected
by the new discharge provision, 155 then what should represent the
products of the debtor's new life remain exposed to the attachment
of inchoate liens surviving bankruptcy.'"
In this limited capacity, lien creditors at the time of bankruptcy without then attachable value in property subject to their
liens, as well as those substantially undersecured, may view the
non-avoidance of their liens as a red flag signaling a lapse into dormancy until equity worth attaching develops post-discharge in
property passing through bankruptcy. Viewed in this light, possible pitfalls surrounding the discharge injunction aptly illustrate
the potential of section 506(d) as a valued remedy. As a curative
remedy, and to fix values which may later become inascertainable,
the section is important. Yet ultimately, it is by providing a simple
and efficient means to bridge the last remaining gap within the
bankruptcy discharge, obviating later concerns with the many
questions surrounding the injunction's scope, that section 506(d) is
put to its greatest use. 16 By operation of section 506(d) during the
bankruptcy proceeding, the problem of inchoate lien survival is put
to an early and final rest. So considered, section 506(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code should be viewed as a remedy which debtor's
counsel cannot overlook.

155. I.e., truly after-acquired property. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 149.

157. See, e.g., supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX

As one of the more controversial provisions of the new Bankruptcy Code, section 522(f) has become the subject of more case
development than perhaps any other section of the Code.' Yet despite the extent of discussion, little has been written with respect
to exactly what is accomplished by the avoidance of a lien under
section 522(0.2 The section reads as follows:
(f)Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may

avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property

to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the
debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in
any(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal,
family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the

debtor;

(B) implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of
the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor.8

Because avoidance of the lien by the trustee in effect avoids
the lien entirely as far as its future assertion by the creditor, no
insight into the proper interpretation of the term avoidance in the
section 522(0 context may be gleaned from other sections of the
Code,' for if nothing else is apparent from the lead-in sentence of
section 522(0, it is at least clear that the lien is affected only "to
the extent [it] impairs an exemption."' The issue addressed by this
appendix is whether the lien is void or merely subordinated to this
extent. For the reasons which follow, subordination should be considered the better view.'
1. 11 U.s.c. § 522(f)(1978).
2. Id.
3. Id.

4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548, 549, 724(a).

5. See supra text accompanying note 3.

6. But see In re Pitre, 11 Bankr. 777, 780-81 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1981); In re
LaRue, 13 Bankr. 846, 848 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
522.29 (15th ed. 1979).
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Looking first to the language of section 522(f), the words used

are singularly unique, both within the Code as well as under the

prior Act. The section allows "the debtor [to] avoid the fixing of a
lien to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption. '" Although

cryptic, this phrase nonetheless suggests that avoidance in this
context means something less than voidance, such as subordination. This lead-in sentence could have been drafted to allow the
debtor to void a lien to the extent it impairs an exemption, as the
term void clearly was not foreign to the drafters of the Code.8 In
line with the trustee's powers of avoidance,' it could also have been
drafted to simply allow the avoidance of a lien to the extent it impairs an exemption. Of course, neither of these alternatives were
reduced to final draft. Is this because Congress intended to treat
lien avoidance in this context differently than in the trustee
context?10

Further support for the subordination view may be found in
section 522(c) which recognizes the continued validity and enforce-

Cf. 1 NORTON BANKR. LAW AND PRACTICE § 26.38 (1981); Vukowich, Debtor's
Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REv. 769 (1980)
(reaching opposite conclusion).
See also In re Rodgers, 2 COLLIER BANKR. CAB. 2d (MB) 1294, 1299 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1980); In re Pockat, 6 Bankr. 24, 25-26 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1980); Gantt
v. First Nat'l Bank, 7 Bankr. 13, 14 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Joyner, 7
Bankr. 596, 600 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980); 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy 318 (2d ed.
1980) (where opposite conclusion is reached without extensive analysis).
7. See supra text accompanying note 3.
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 349(c), 363(n), 522(c), 524(a),

551.

9. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
10. At one point in the House Report it is stated that "[t]he debtor may void
any judicial lien on exempt property, and any nonpurchase-money security interest in certain exempt property such as household goods." While this was in reference to proposed § 522(f), it reveals little with respect to the status of liens
avoided by operation of this section. The Report continues by stating that this
"allows the debtor to undo the actions of creditors that bring legal action against
the debtor shortly before bankruptcy .... If a creditor beats the debtor into
court, the debtor is nevertheless entitled to his exemptions." H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126-27, 362-63 (1977) [hereinafter H. REP.].
Because eleventh hour transfers of this nature are avoidable as preferences
by the trustee, or by the debtor if the trustee does not act, the rationale given by
the House Report for § 522(f) lien avoidance is unconvincing. In fact, the debtor
may do better to attack the lien as a preference, for unlike § 522(f), § 547 would
seem to avoid the lien entirely. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(h), 547. Nothing else in the
legislative history serves to cast light on this problem. But see also H. Rm., supra
note 10, at 362.
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ability of liens notwithstanding bankruptcy or the debtor's discharge, excepting only those liens avoided or voided under specifically enumerated sections of the Code."1 Given the otherwise allencompassing scope of this section with respect to lien continuance
and post-discharge survival, the absence of any reference to section
522(f) lien avoidance is glaring. The implication is that avoidance
under section 522(f) only subordinates, rather than voids, the affected lien. This would explain why there is no mention of section
522(0 in section 522(c). If the lien is to continue, albeit subordinated to an exemption, the omission of reference to section 522(0
is comprehensible. If the lien is to be viewed as void to the extent
it otherwise would have impaired an exemption, this could have
been provided for, not only in section 522(0, but also by reference
in section 522(c) as well.
There is a practical consequence which flows from the voidance/subordination distinction." Once a lien is avoided under section 522(0 to the extent it otherwise would have impaired an exemption, then to the extent there is no currently attachable value
to look to for satisfaction of the lien, it remains as unsecured.
Given the problems discussed concerning post-discharge lien survival, debtor's counsel should at this point proceed under section
506(d) to void the lien after section 522(0 avoidance.1 3
Finally, while the proper interpretation of section 522(f) is still
of some concern where the avoidance of a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest is involved,' 4 the section is now
largely inapplicable where a debtor faced with the assertion of a
11. Section 522(c) provides:

(c) Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this section is
not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose,
or that is determined under section 502 of this title as if such claim had
arisen before the commencement of the case, except(1) a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a)(1) or section
523(a)(5) of this title; or
(2) a lien that is(A) not avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or
724(a) of this title;
(B) not voided under section 506(d) of this title; or
(C)(i) a tax lien, notice of which is properly filed; and
(ii) avoided under section 545(2) of this title.
12. I.e., to the extent a lien is avoided, if it is only subordinated to the exemption claimed, it may remain to that extent as a valid lien, albeit as unsecured.
13. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 506(d), 522(c). See also note 117 text.
14. See supra note 5.
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judgment lien files for bankruptcy after January 1, 1981.15 Section
522(f) appears to have been drafted to complement section 522(d)
and those state exemption schemes which tend to mimic the federal pattern.1 Where state law first accomplishes for the debtor
what section 522(f) would otherwise do, there is no need to file a
complaint to avoid liens under this section of the Code nor, for
that matter, is there authority to do so. A condition precedent to
proceeding under section 522(f) is that a claimed exemption will be
impaired by the assertion of a lien. 17 Since a judgment lien generally cannot attach to a validly claimed homestead under Illinois
law,"' section 522(f)(1) is an unnecessary and unavailing remedy
for debtor relief. Once the exemption for homestead is claimed,
debtor's counsel would better serve the client by looking to the
remedy available under section 506(d) to void the judgment lien to
the extent it is unsecured.1 9

15. A debtor in bankruptcy will now look to chapter 52 of the Illinois Revised

Statutes to determine his available exemptions. See text note 46.

16. See H. REP., supra note 10.
17. See supra note 5.
18. This is the usual case involving a lien arising from a memorandum of
judgment. Where a confession of judgment with a waiver of exemption is at issue,

the debtor may still need to proceed under § 522(0 to have it avoided. See ILL.

ch. 52, §§ 1, 4 (1967 & West. Supp. 1981-1982).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). In an attempt to sell real estate sometime after bankruptcy, the existence of the § 506(d) court order would surely serve better to cure
REV. STAT.

title problems than an order of court avoiding liens under § 522(f). This is because, if subordinated to the extent avoided under § 522(f), the lien still continues. Even if void to the extent avoided, the voidance would only be to the extent
the lien would otherwise impair the exemption. Section 506(d), on the other hand,

voids not only the subordinated portion of the lien, but the unsecured balance as
well. See also text note 34 and accompanying text.

